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LUDWIK A. TECLAFF* and EILEEN TECLAFF**
International Control of Cross-
Media Pollution-An Ecosystem
Approach
ABSTRACT
Cross-media pollution, or the transfer of pollutants from one en-
vironmental medium to another, is a growing international problem
that long escaped attention because treaties and the institutions to
implement them were devised usually to protect only one element of
the environment-air, land, or water. A more holistic, ecosystem
approach is needed for so complex an issue, and this article suggests
the river basin as an areal unit for that approach. After analyzing
the functions of existing international basin commissions, the article
concludes that if their functions were appropriately expanded these
entities would be eminently suitable to deal with cross-media pol-
lution, thereby dispensing with the need to create new institutions
to manage this old but newly discovered problem.
A new term has recently entered the lexicon of environmental usage-
cross-media pollution.' It means a pollution that has moved or may move
from one environmental medium to another (for example, from air to
land, from land to water, or from land to air). The expression indicates
an unexpected movement of pollutants that was not provided for in do-
mestic legislation or international agreements for the control of pollution.
It is one more example of the profound and complex interrelationships
within our physical environment. This paper suggests that the interacting
relationship of different types of pollution requires a holistic approach
within an area where environmental elements or media also interact in
an ecosystem.2 The river basin is such an ecosystem, and has long been
*Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
**Freelance writer on environmental subjects.
I. For example, it was the theme of a conference held in Washington, D.C., in Nov. 1984. The
proceedings of that conference were subsequently published, CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, NEw
PERSPECTIVES ON POLLUTION CONTROL: CROSS-MEDIA PROBLEMS, AN ISSUE REPORT (1985) [hereinafter
cited as NEw PERsPEcnvEs]. Cross-media pollution was also discussed in ORGAN7ATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT, THE STATE OF TE ENVIRONMENT 1985 65-66, 246-47,
264-65 (1985), [hereinafter cited as OECD 1985].
2. The term "ecosystem" has been in use by ecologists for many years. See, e.g., the definition
given in P.R. EHRuuc, A.H. EHRucH, AND J.P. HoLDREN, EcoScENCE: POPULATION, RESOURCES,
ENVIRONMENT 97 (1977):
The interdependence that characterizes the physical and biological elements of the en-
vironment has led ecologists to coin the term ecosystem (short for ecological system) for
the functional unit that includes both biotic (living) and abiotic (nonliving) elements.
Only recently, however, has the term become part of the language of international law. A notable
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recognized as a natural unit for international cooperation in water man-
agement and protection.' That cooperation is already fairly well organized
and, if international river basin institutions were appropriately strength-
ened and their functions expanded beyond water management, a holistic
approach to transfrontier pollution could be implemented.
Characteristics of Cross-Media Pollution
How does cross-media pollution arise and why, after decades of en-
vironmental regulation, is it an apparently new and serious problem? Take
an everyday occurrence. What we think of as ordinary domestic trash-
used containers of chlorine bleach, insect spray, antifreeze, paint thinner,
or oven cleaner-goes to the municipal dump. There the toxins, instead
of staying put in the landfill, leak into the soil and ground water and
eventually contaminate the local water supply, perhaps even the sur-
rounding air.' This is cross-media pollution. Black-smoke industries spew
sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide into the air from tall stacks that carry
these pollutants away from the immediate neighborhood. The chemicals
are borne aloft on currents of the upper air and come down hundreds of
miles away in the form of acid rain, which destroys forests, kills fish,
changes lake water to the acidity of lemon juice, and corrodes buildings.5
This is another example of cross-media pollution.
example is the text of the agreement signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in July, 1985, by the
member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Agreement on the Con-
servation of Nature and Natural Resources, Bmnei-indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore-Thaland, July 9,
1985. The text was not immediately released for publication: it is printed in full in 15 ENvT'L POL.
& L. 64 (1985). The Preamble and art.s 6-9 all refer to "ecosystems" and art. 11 notes the adverse
effect that pollution may have on "the functioning of natural ecosystems as well as on each of the
individual ecosystem components .... "This. agreement is considered the most modem regional
instrument in the conservation field.
On recent applications of the term "ecosystem" to river basins, see infra notes 61-64.
3. See infra notes 48-51.
4. The horrendous pollution caused by industrial dumping at landfills has captured most of the
attention and, for example, almost the entire Superfund program in the United States has been and
is being devoted to cleaning up such sites. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. § 2767 (1980), popularly known as the
Superfund Act. What is not often realized, however, is the extent to which ordinary household
garbage contributes to the hazards of municipal landfills, or that such "domestic" wastes may pollute
several media at once. See, e.g., the illuminating article by Boraiko, Storing Up Trouble ...
Hazardous Wastes, 167 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. 319 (Mar. 1985). A Dutch environmental orga-
nization has urged that this problem be addressed by government collection of what it terms "small
chemical waste." 9 INT'L ENv. RaP. (BNA), CuRR. REP. 133 (1986).
5. There is a voluminous literature on acid rain pollution in North America and Europe. See,
e.g., UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CIRCULAR 923, ACID
PRECIPITATION: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1984), which contains more than 1,600 entries on
the subject. According to one resource specialist, more than 3,000 scientific papers have been
published in the past 15 years, documenting the causes and effects of acid rain. Sheiman, Facing
Facts: Acid Rain Update. 7 AMICUs J. 4 (No. 4, 1986). On the long battle to restrain the use of tall
stacks as a pollution control technology in the United States see Vestigo, Acid Rain and Tall Stack
Regulation Under the Clean Air Act, 15 Nw. U. L. Ray. 711 (1985); and NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL, TALL STACKS, A DECADE OF ILLEGAL USE: A DECADE OF DAMAGE DOwNWIND:
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CLEAN AIR COALITION (1985). Eventually, the Environmental Protection
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From one environmental medium to another, the transfer of pollutants
continues all the time. Indeed, this is not really a new phenomenon, but
one that was, until recently, not recognized. It has been around since the
dawn of history, and probably even before that. The salination of soil in
Antiquity in parts of Mesopotamia and Egypt could be considered an
instance of cross-media pollution through overly intensive irrigation, which
leached toxic minerals from deep below the land surface.6 Egypt lost
some 1.5 million acres of agricultural land in the Nile delta in the period
of late Roman and early Arab rule. The canal network broke down,
hindering drainage to the sea, and so a once-fertile area became an alkali
desert.7 Until the development of municipal sewage systems, cities had
to dispose of night soil and other wastes in surrounding fields or in pits,
which caused considerable pollution of both ground and surface water
Mining and smelting, too, have done their share in shifting substances
around in air, water, and on land. Fourteenth-century tin miners in south-
western England and twentieth-century oil drillers in the United States
alike have been held responsible for doing damage to a medium other
than the one in which they worked. The miners were held responsible
for silting up coastal harbors and the oil drillers for injecting oilfield
brines into ground water.9 The deep-well injection of petroleum and chem-
ical wastes has become, in the modem era, an increasingly serious source
of cross-media pollution. Toxic substances have been found to migrate
long distances underground and come to the surface miles from the point
of injection, contaminating soil, water, and even the atmosphere. In the
United States more hazardous wastes are being disposed of by this means
than are stored in dumpsites, and some deep-well injections close to the
Great Lakes are a potential threat to Canadian communities.'o However,
the polluters are not all from one side of the frontier. There is evidence
Agency was required, by a court order which the agency challenged in vain, to issue final rules
restricting the use of tall stacks. Sierra Club v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 719 F.2d
436 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. Sierra Club, 468 U.S. 1203
(1984).
6. See A HISTORY OF LAND USE IN ARID REGIONS 96-97 (L.D. Stamp ed. 1961); see also T.
JACOBSEN, TOWARD THE IMAGE OF TAMMUZ AND OTHER ESSAYS ON MESOPOTAMIAN HISTORY AND
CULTURE 156 (1970).
7. Hamdan, Evolution of Irrigation Agriculture in Egypt, in A HISTORY OF LAND USE IN ARID
REGIONS, supra note 6, at 119.
8. See, e.g., A.S. WISDOM, TtHE LAW ON THE PoLLTLtIoN OF WATERS 7 (1966). Another way of
getting rid of effluent was to pour it down a well, regardless of where it might end up. A starch
factory in Paris, for instance, reportedly discharged 20,000 gallons of polluted water a day into such
a well in the winter of 1832-1833. G.P. MARSH, MAN AND NATuRE 308 (1864, reprint 1965).
9. On the English tin miners, see L.A. TEcLAFF, THE R-vER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAw 75-76
(1967); on the Texas oil companies, see Brown v. Lundell, 334 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Ct. App. 1960),
aj'd, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961), and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Alexander, 291 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Ct. App.
1956), writs denied, 295 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1956).
10. Brown, The Lower Depths: Underground Injection of Hazardous Wastes, 7 AMIcUs J. 14, 17
(No. 3, 1986). Brown cites an instance at Presque Isle State Park, on Lake Erie, which could extend
into Canada. Id. at 23; and map at 16, showing the number of injection sites adjacent to the Great
Lakes.
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that toxic chemical, wastes injected by Canadian companies into wells
and an underground salt cavern in southwestern Ontario are leaching into
the St. Clair River, to the distress of Michigan authorities."
Throughout history a great deal of cross-media pollution occurred due
to ignorance, lack of regulation, or sheer disregard of the consequences.
However, a disturbing amount of cross-media pollution has resulted from
efforts to control pollution and improve environmental quality. Paradox-
ically, environmental regulation itself appears to be to blame. Typically,
a problem is recognized. The action is taken by law, by treaty, or through
the courts; and a new problem ensues. For example, nearly a century
ago, the German city of Essen, in the Ruhr Valley, was, in effect, enjoined
from discharging any of its sewage into the river-a desperate measure
resorted to by a desperate downstream community. Fortunately, the sit-
uation was alleviated by other means. Instead of forcing Essen to drown
in its own effluvia, the Ruhr towns banded together to form pollution
control organizations and achieved their goal by cooperation, rather than
by sanctions. 2
The few anti-pollution provisions in treaties early in this century flatly
prohibited the discharge of pollutants of any kind or any amount into
surface waters.' 3 Such all-embracing general prohibitions were usually
unenforceable, or resulted in a transfer of effluent to the soil or ground
water, or both. For example, a fisheries convention of 1904, between
France and Switzerland, states categorically that:
Factories, mills and other establishments located in the vicinity of
the Lake (of Geneva) are prohibited from discharging into the waters
waste or substances injurious to fish. Such establishments are under
the obligation to ensure at their own cost that such substances are
discharged into the soil.'4
11. Palmer-Benson, The Blobs. 7 AMICUS J. 6 (No. 4, 1986).
12. Fair, Pollution Abatement in the Ruhr District, in COMPARISONS IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
156 (H. Jarrett, ed. 1961). On the Ruhr associations, see paper by Gieseke, River Basin Authorities
on the Ruhr and on Other Rivers in Germany, 2 U.N. Conference on Water Pollution Problems in
Europe, Documents 277-82, WATER PoLL./CoNF. 2 (1961).
An even older, international example occurred in the basin of the Espierre River, which flows
from France into Belgium. From 1872 onwards, the Espierre carried off into Belgium, among other
highly polluted waters, the effluent from a factory on the French side which had been forbidden by
French authorities to discharge its wastes through the sewer system into French streams. Delos &
Lentacker, The Espierre Problem: A Case of Transfrontier Pollution, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVE.OPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECION IN FRONTIER REGIONS 290, 296
(1979) [hereinafter cited as OECD FRONTIER REGIONS].
13. Such generalized prohibitions occur, for instance, in the Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11,
1909, United States-United Kingdom (Canada), art. IV, 36 Stat. 2448, 2450 (1909-11) T.S. No.
548; and in the Frontier Waters Agreement, Apr. 10, 1922, Denmark-Germany, art. 29, 10 L.N.T.S.
187, text also in U.N. LEGISLATIVE TEXTS AND TREATY PROVISIONS CONcERNING THE UTILIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS FOR OTHER PuiuosEs THAN NAVIGATION 577, 588, ST/LEG.ISER.B/12
(1963) [hereinafter cited as U.N. LEGIs. SER.].
14. Convention for the Regulation of Fishing in Frontier Waters, Mar. 9, 1904, France-Switz-
erland, Martens Nouveau Recueil, 2e set., tome 33, at 501; text also in U.N. LEGIs. SER., supra
note 13, at 701.
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These earlier pollution regulations were sporadic and had only a local
effect, but the modem laws and treaties have had another effect altogether.
Their number is legion, and ranges from village ordinances all the way
up to global, multilateral conventions. They are often specific, prescribing
"black" lists, "grey" lists, and precise quantities, times, places, and
means of disposal of individually named pollutants. 5 Their drafters had
good intentions, but the outcome, in many instances, has been an un-
looked-for transfer of contamination from one medium to another.'6 In
the 1970s, for instance, land disposal of municipal sewage was encour-
aged and supported by environmental regulation. 17 Today, it has been
singled out as a prime source of cross-media pollution. A study published
in 1985, and prepared at the request of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, discloses that:
Federal environmental legislation in the 1970s and 1980s encouraged
end-of-pipe waste treatment methods, rather than waste reduction
measures, to control air and water pollutants. Regulators favored
end-of-pipe technologies because they were easy to enforce. From
industry's perspective, this type of treatment offered tax advantages
and produced easily measurable results-benefits not generally at-
tributed to alternative means of regulatory compliance, such as waste
reduction. End-of-pipe treatment methods often resulted, however.
in the transfer of waste residuals from one environmental medium
to another. '
Many transfers of pollution go unremarked by authority because the
bulk of national and international regulation refers to a single medium--
air, land, or water-and is further compartmentalized according to the
type of pollutant (for example, solid versus liquid waste) dr type of
recipient medium (for example, surface water, ground water, drinking
15. See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution, Dec. 3,
1976, 16 I.L.M. 242 (1977). A similar division of substances by their toxicity is to be found, e.g.,
in Lists I and II of the Annex to European Economic Community, Council Directive of 4 May 1976
on Pollution Caused by Certain Dangerous Substances Discharged into the Aquatic Environment of
the Community, O.J. EuR. COMM. 23 (No. L 129, 1976).
16. Even restorative measures can backfire. Two companies ordered to clean up contaminated
groundwater in California's Silicon Valley were discovered to be pumping it, untreated, into a nearby
creek which recharged hitherto uncontaminated wells. 16 ENV'T. REP. (BNA), CUt. DEv. 1035-
36 (1985).
17. E.g., by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816, 824, 841K (1972); and Environmental Protection Agency regulations in 40 C.F.R.
§§ 35.900-35.970. See Massey, How Federal Law Encourages Land Application of Municipal
Wastewater Effluents and Sludges, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 1 (1982).
18. See OECD 1985, supra note 1, at 163-64.
19. U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Hazardous Waste Management: Recent Changes
and Policy Alternatives 44 (1985).
For several awful examples of legislative and administrative intent gone astray, see GoodIntentions
Can Take Their Toll on the Terrain, New York Times, May I1, 1986, at E5, col. I. E.g.. state
officials on Long Island, N.Y., who were concerned about air pollution from garbage burning but
were ignorant of the porosity of the island's soils, forced municipalities to bury the wastes in sanitary
landfills which rapidly leaked toxic chemicals into underlying groundwater. Id. col. 1.
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water). Different agencies become responsible for implementing these
different instruments and develop their own "constituencies" of polluters.
Officials are largely unaware of what other agencies are doing, despite
the fact that, within the past quarter of a century, many countries have
centralized their environmental regulation under a single umbrella de-
partment, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the
United States.20
Transboundary pollution problems have been dealt with in similar fash-
ion. Countries drafted treaties to cope with specific situations as they
arose, and often established separate regulating entities for each treaty.
For instance, on the Rhine River, there is one international commission
which deals only with discharges of chlorides and other chemicals, and
another which deals only with pollution from vessels. 2' When the United
States and Mexico signed a comprehensive water treaty in 1944,22 they
gave the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) authority
in matters such as Colorado River salinity, which afflicts Mexican farmers,
and Tijuana's overflowing sewage, which afflicts Californian coastal com-
munities.' However, when the two countries recently signed a general
environmental agreement, they did not give the implementing role to the
IBWC but, instead, established national coordinators. 4
20. Noted by Deputy Administrator Alvin L. Aim, of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
who said:
Plenty of environmental officials, in the EPA and in the states, still spend their whole
careers working on one environmental medium. Often their disciplines add to this
inertia: a sanitary engineer works on water pollution and a meteorologist on air pollution
and neither gains sufficient knowledge of, the other medium or of the larger system.
The EPA's Approach to Cross-Media Problems, in NEw PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 9.
On the centralization of environmental regulation under a single department, see U.N. Environment
Programme (UNEP), The State of the Environment 1976: Report of the Executive Director 14-15,
U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/58 (Jan. 30, 1976).
21. The International Commission for Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution is responsible
for implementation of the Convention for the Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution,
Dec. 3, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 242 (1977) and the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against
Pollution by Chloride, also Dec. 3, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 265 (1977). The Commission was established
by the Convention of Apr. 29, 1963, between France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, and Switzerland (known as the Berne Agreement), English translation of text in
A.J. PEASLEE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS, Part Five, 430 (Rev. 3d ed. 1976).
22. Treaty Relating to the Utilization of the Colorado, Tijuana, and Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944,
United States-Mexico, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994, with supplementary protocol signed Nov. 14,
1944. Under art. 3, the parties agreed to give preferential attention to the solution of all border
sanitation problems.
23. On the role of the IBWC and extension of its jurisdiction under the treaty, see Utton, An
Assessment of the Management of U.S.-Mexican Water Resources: Anticipating the Year 2000, 22
NAT. REs. J. 1093 (1982).
24. Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the
Border Area (the Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement), Aug. 14, 1983, United States-
Mexico, 22 I.L.M. 1025 (1983). See also St. Dep't Press Release No. 313 of Aug. 19, 1983. The
Agreement addresses air, land and water pollution (art. 5) and acknowledges the work of the
International Boundary and Water Commission (Preamble). It proclaims that nothing shall affect the
functions entrusted to that body (art. 12), but does not give the IBWC a specific role. art. 8 designates
as National Coordinators the Environmental Protection Agency, for the United States, and the
Subsecretariat of Ecology of the Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE), for
Mexico.
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As a result of all this regulation on a medium-by-medium basis, some
polluters are transferring contamination entirely in accordance with the
law, while others either resort to illegal means of disposal or slip through
cracks in the regulatory system. Internationally, this has produced a phe-
nomenon termed "waste tourism." '" Waste containing dioxin from a
chemical plant in Austria, for example, reportedly made a European.
"grand tour" before being finally eliminated in the North Sea. It was
sent first by rail to Szczecin in Poland, then by freighter to Antwerp,
where it was put in storage tanks. When its deadly dioxin content was
discovered, the waste was hurriedly transferred to an incinerator ship for
burning offshore.26 Had an accident occurred, the dioxin could have
contaminated the environment in any one of three countries or two bodies
of water, the Baltic and the North Sea.
It has been estimated that up to 50 percent of hazardous waste in Europe
is disposed of illegally.2' Waste is also transferred across frontiers from
medium to medium either by permit or in the absence of regulation. In
many industrialized countries waste dumps lie close to international
boundaries-for example, the Schoenberg dump in East Germany, only
a few kilometers from the drinking water supply of the West German city
of Lubeck,28 or the dumpsites by the Niagara River, which threaten water
supplies on both sides of the United States-Canadian border.29
The Search for Remedies
Cross-media pollution is, nevertheless, beginning to be recognized,
nationally and internationally, as a distinct problem with innumerable
interactions and ramifications. For example, the Conservation Foundation
held a conference in Washington, D.C., in 1984 to draw attention to the
matter, and has an ongoing project called "Options for a New Environ-
mental Policy." Under this project it is gathering data, exploring policy
measures, and working with other institutions, such as the National Acad-
emy of Sciences, on the formulation of research."
Several countries, among them the Netherlands, Sweden, West Ger-
many, and the United States, are attempting to integrate their environ-
25. See Smets, Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Wastes, 14 ENVr'L POL. & L. 16, 20 n. 6
(1985).
26. Id. where its itinerary is described in more detail and where other, equally lurid, examples
are given.
27. Id. at 20 n. 5.
28. The Commission of the European Communities was questioned in 1980 about the Shoenberg
dump and about the propriety of storing hazardous wastes generated within the community in border
areas of third countries. Written Question No. 1687/79, O.J. Etm. COMM. 82 (No. C 126, 1980),
text also in TECLAFF & UTroN, INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAw 335 (1981). According to Smets,
supra, note 25, at 17, a significant amount of the hazardous waste sent across frontiers in Western
Europe is exported to the German Democratic Republic, because it may be disposed of there at
lower cost.
29. See HANG & SALvo, THE RAvAGED RIvER: Toxic CHEMICALS IN THE NIAGARA (1981). According
to this study, more than 50 dumps are close to the Niagara River. Id. at 3.
30. NEw PERsPEcTnVES, supra note 1, at 3.
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mental protection activities, not only between individual pollution control
procedures, but also with other government programs."a In the United
States, the EPA is reportedly reviewing all environmental legislation to
determine instances where the law encourages cross-media transfer of
pollutants.32 In furtherance of this new policy, for instance, the agency
published notice of regulatory investigation of methylene chloride, ini-
tiated under air, water, drinking water and chemical statutes.33 Section
III A of the notice recognizes that:
Sources of methylene chloride are multiple and potentially subject
to regulation under several EPA statutes; therefore only a coordinated
approach will result in consistent and non-duplicative regulatory de-
cisions. Thus, this ANPR announces both EPA's initiation of appro-
priate action under Section 6 of TSCA ... and an integrated regulatory
investigation.'
Also, because disposal of sewage sludge is regulated under various stat-
utes according to the disposal method used, and is now known to cause
intermedia transfer of pollutants, the EPA is also compiling profiles of
contaminants in sludge to determine which media they are likely to affect
and how to prevent these effects.35
Moreover, the EPA has begun to assess total human exposure to toxic
substances in a given geographic area. One of the areas already studied
is the Santa Clara Valley in California.36 Another, in process of being
analyzed, is the Kanawha Valley of West Virginia. Most of the effort
there will concentrate on characterizing air emissions, but will also es-
timate risk from all potential pathways of contamination, including water
and hazardous waste.37
Some recent treaties and recommendations of international organiza-
tions have also taken into account cross-media pollution. For example,
in 1978 the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD), in recommendations on water management, proposed that:
31. OECD 1985, supra note 1, at 246-47. In 1984, the European Parliament urged the European
Economic Community to combine into a single and effective central convention all the international
conventions, EEC directives, and national laws for protecting the North Sea. The text of the resolution
is contained in O.J. Etm. Comm. 135 (No. C 46, 1984).
32. According to EPA Administrator Lee M. Thomas, speaking at a meeting of the Natural
Resources Council of America on May 30, 1985. 16 ENV'T REP. (BNA), CuRR. DEv. 335 (1985).
33. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,037 (Oct. 17, 1985).
34. Id. at 42,041.
35. 16 ENV'T REP. (BNA), CuRR. Dcv. 1095 (1985).
36. OECD 1985, supra note 1, at 66.
37. 16 ENv'T REP. (BNA), Cuan. DEv. 898-99 (1985). See also Excerpts from Budget Office
Regulatory Program Listing EPA Priorities from Apr. 1, 1985, to Mar. 31, 1986 (released Aug. 8,
1985), text in 16 ENV'T REP. (BNA), CuRR. DEv. 658 et seq., (1985). EPA's Agency Operating
Guidance FY 1986-1987, establishing 12 categories of significant regulatory action, gives as Category
10, "Implement a coordinated approach to solve multimedia pollution concerns in discrete geographic
areas." Id. at 659.
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Authorities should ensure that the water pollution control measures
they implement do not lead to uncontrolled pollution transfers to
other water resources or to soil or air systems."
The Council's comment on this recommendation indicated the direction
future control should take, but only in very general terms:
Experience shows that the polluter will, in general, attempt to dis-
charge waste where the operation is least costly and the controls less
stringent (for example, direct discharge of effluents through ground-
waters; incineration with generation of air pollution, etc.). In order
to combat uncontrolled discharge and undesirable transfers of pol-
lution, authorities responsible for environmental protection should
ensure that economic and regulatory instruments and controls, both
for the different types of water resources and for other media (air,
soil), are comprehensive and correctly balanced.39
The OECD addressed the problem again in its 1985 Report on the State
of the Environment.' Among the new pollution concerns described in
the survey was cross-media pollution arising from the use of sewage
sludge as fertilizer.'
Two recent instruments on air pollution refer to the transfer of pollutants
from medium to medium. One is the Geneva Convention on Long Range
Transboundary Air Pollution, which emphasizes the need to "monitor
chemical components in other media such as water, soil and vegeta-
tion.... 42 The other is the 1980 United States-Canadian Memorandum
of Intent (on Transboundary Air Pollution), which obligates the two parties
to "exchange information generated in research programs being under-
taken in both countries on the atmospheric aspects of the transport of air
pollutants and on their effects on aquatic and terrestrial ecosys-
tems. . ... 
On a broader scale, the International Joint Commission, United States-
Canada, is exploring a new concept of monitoring major North American
ecological trends through an integrated transboundary network of basic
38. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Recommendations of the Council
on Water Management Policies & Instruments, issued in Paris, Apr. 5. 1978, No. 7, Doc. C (78)
4 (Final), text also in LAw OF INTERNATIoNAL WATER RESOuCRS 193 (FAO Legislative Study No.
23)(D. Caponera, comp., 1980) [hereinafter cited as CAPoNERA 1980].
39. Id. Appendix No. 7, CAmONmIRA 1980, supra note 38, at 195.
40. OECD 1985, supra note 1, at 65.
41. Id. at 65, 79, 163. See also the declaration adopted by the OECD Environment Committee
in June 1985, which proclaims that the OECD member governments will reduce overall pollution
through comprehensive control "so that problems are not transferred from one part of the environment
to another." Environment: Resource for the Future, Declaration of the OECD Environment Com-
mittee, 18-20 June 1985, reprinted in 14 ENVT'L POL. & L. 34 (1985).
42. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 18 LL.M. 1442,
T.I.A.S. No. 10541 (1979).
43. Memorandum of Intent Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, United States-
Canada, 20 l.L.M. 690, 692, T.I.A.S. No. 9856 (1981).
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scientific and resource management information gathering. The purpose
of this project is to anticipate, detect, and avoid major environmental
problems along the United States-Canadian border."
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) dealt with the
matter more directly in its Montreal Guidelines on Protection of the
Marine Environment Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources. 5 Ac-
cording to the Guidelines:
In taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution from
land-based sources, States have the duty to act so as not to transfer
... damage or hazards from one area to another or transform such
pollution into another type of pollution."
Similarly, Article 195 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea binds the parties not to transfer pollution, stating that:
In taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment, States shall act so as not to transfer, directly
or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another or transform
one type of pollution into another.47
A Natural Unit for Pollution Control-The River Basin as Ecosystem
In addition to the growing awareness of the threat posed by transfers
of pollution, there has been a slow transition from acknowledgment of
the river basin as a drainage unit to its acknowledgment as an ecological
unit, or ecosystem. Its physical unity predisposes the drainage basin to
be the best areal unit for national and international water management
and this has long been advocated in the literature. Three decades ago,
the United Nations gave the drainage basin concept official endorsement,
when the Secretary-General, in his report to the Economic and Social
Council, stated unequivocally that "river basin development is now rec-
ognized as an essential feature of economic development." 48 Also, in
1958, the U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs published
the report of a panel of experts established to review the economic and
44. The IJC co-sponsored a workshop to that end at the Philadelphia Academy of Natural Sciences
in Oct. 1984. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT UNDER THE GREAT
LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT OF 1978, 6 (1984) [hereinafter cited as LIC SECOND BIENNIAL
REP.].
45. United Nations Environment Programme, Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts, Montreal, 11-
19 Apr. 1985. Guidelines on Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution from Land
Based Sources. UNEPVG. 120/3 (Part IV), reprinted in 14 ENVT'L POL. & L. 77 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as MoNTREAL. GUIDELINES].
46. Id.
47. UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA 71 (1983).
48. 21 U.N. ESCOR Annex Off. Rec. 21st Sess., at 6, U.N. Doc. E12827 (1956).
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social implications of the integrated river basin.49 While the domestic
legislation embodying the concept dates back more than half a century,5"
international agreements embracing entire basins only began to be pro-
mulgated in the 1950s."
The idea of using the basin as a unit for water pollution control came
more slowly to fruition. Although states have incorporated pollution pro-
visions in water management treaties since the latter part of the 19th
century, most of these provisions are confined to boundary waters. 2 Some
twenty years or so ago, however, international organizations such as the
International Law Association53 and the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe (ECE)"' began to adopt policy declarations on water
pollution control in the context of the drainage basin. Slowly these pol-
icies, if not translated into very effective state practice, were at least
incorporated in treaties.55
Later came the realization that the full potential of the international
drainage basin for water management and pollution protection can only
49. U.N. Dep't of Economic and Social Affairs, Integrated River Basin Development, U.N. Doc.
No. E13066 (1958). The report stated:
It is now widely recognized that individual water projects-whether single or multiple
purpose--cannot as a rule be undertaken with optimum benefit for the people affected
before there is at least the broad outline of a plan for the entire drainage area.
Id. at 1.
50. E.g., the British Land Drainage Act of 1930 (20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 44 §§ 1, 83, 1930); the
Tennessee Valley Act of 1933, ch. 32, §§ 22-23, 48 Stat. 58, 69 (establishing the Tennessee Valley
Authority); and the French Law Approving the Plan of Works for Improvement of the Rhone from
the Swiss Frontier to the Sea from the Point of View of Power, Irrigation. Navigation, and Other
Agricultural Uses, May 27, 1921 (21 Duvergier, Collection Complete Des Lois (N.S.) 261). More
recent legislation would include the U.S. Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 244; the
French Law Concerning the Regime and Distribution of Waters and Protection Against Pollution,
Dec. 16, 1964 (47 Bull. Legislatif Dalloz 676, 1964); and the Delaware River Basin Compact of
1961 (75 Stat. 688, 689, 691).
51. E.g.. Statute of the Committee for Co-Ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong
Basin, Oct. 31, 1957, text in U.N. LEGis. SER., supra note 13, at 267. See also the table, International
Agreements Reviewed and Agencies Established, in UNrrED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF TECHNICAL
COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT, EXPERIENCES IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL RIVER AND LAKE BASINS 62-64 (NATuRAL RESOuRcEs/WATER SERIES No. 10). ST/ESA/120
(1983) [hereinafter cited as ExPERIENcEs].
52. See the table in J.G. LAMMERS, POLtMON OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 124-25 passim
(1984). Boundary waters are defined in the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 as "waters from main
shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting waters, or the portions thereof, along
which the international boundary ... passes." Boundary Waters Treaty. Jan. 11. 1909, United
States-United Kingdom (Canada), Preliminary article, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548.
53. International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Second Conference, Helsinki, 14-20 Aug.
1966, 484-532 (1967), The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers. The
Helsinki Rules were later amplified by the Rules on Water Pollution in an International Drainage
Basin (by C.B. Bourne, Rapporteur), in International Law Association, Montreal Conference. Report
of the Committee on International Water Resources Law 4-22 (1982).
54. U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, Recommendation to ECE Governments Concerning
River Basin Management, Geneva, 1971, Preamble. EIECEIWATER/9/Annex 2, text in CAPONERA
1980, supra note 38, at 150.
55. See the table in LAMMERS, supra note 52.
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be realized by taking into account the interaction of water and other
elements of the environment within the basin. 6 Such a realization was
forcefully and explicitly expressed in the Articles on the Relationship
between Water, Other Natural Resources and the Environment. 7 These
Articles require states to ensure that:
(t)he management of their natural resources (other than water) and
other environmental elements located within their own boundaries
does not cause substantial damage to the natural condition of the
waters of other States."
The concept found authoritative expression in the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement of 1978,' 9 which treats the drainage basin as an eco-
system and defines it as:
(t)he interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms,
including man, within the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River
at or upstream from the point at which that river becomes the inter-
national boundary between Canada and the United States. . .. "'
Since the 1978 Agreement, ecosystem approaches continue to be adapted
or developed in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin for a wide range of
management problems, and are being considered for other international
river basins, notably in Africa." Also, the concept of the river basin as
ecosystem was one of the four major issues discussed at an international
seminar held at the University of Linkoping, Sweden, in 1984,62 on the
potential of using the river basin as a basis for coordinated land and water
56. This trend was noted at the ECE Committee on Water Problems' Seminar on Co-Operation
in the Field of Transboundary Waters, held at Dusseldorf, 15-19 Oct. 1984 (Water/Sem. 11/3) [here-
inafter cited as DussELDoRF SEMiNAR]. The representative of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) emphasized that:
Many countries of the [European] region, acting individually or jointly with their
neighbours, had created the right conditions for the gradual introduction of the concept
of integrated environmental management ... and for its development over entire
European river basins ... on the basis of flexible and appropriate principles ..
Id. at 10, 35.
57. International Law Association, Belgrade Conference, Report of the Committee on International
Water Resources Law 17.18 (1980); text also in CAPoNERA 1980, supra note 38, at 314.
58. Id. art. I (b).
59. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T.
1384, T.I.A.S. No. 9257.
60. Id. art. I (g).
61. African Ministerial Conference on the Environment, Cairo Programme for African Co-Op-
eration, 16-18 Dec. 1985, reprinted in 16 ENvT'L POL. & L. 27 (1986). Sec. E, on priority subregional
activities, gives priority, inter alia, to supporting and implementing integrated development plans
for Lake Chad and the Niger and Cubango/Cuando rivers in order to use their "waters and ecosystems
rationally." Sec. E.1. (d), (e) and (g). Id. at 28.
62. International Seminar on the Relevance of River Basin Approach for Coordinated Land and
Water Conservation and Management, Linkoping, Sweden, 4-8 June 1984 [hereinafter cited as
LINKOPiNG SEMINAR].
[V/ol. 27
CROSS-MEDIA POLLUTION
conservation and management.63 As one participant in that seminar pointed
out, the ecosystem is connected to the surrounding biosphere by a system
of inputs and outputs, which may be in the form of radiant energy, water,
gases, chemicals, or organic materials moved through the ecosystem
boundary by meteorological, geological, or biological processes. 4 This
concept comes close to the nub of the cross-media pollution problem
because, obviously, some of the inputs and outputs-whether water, gases,
chemicals, or organic materials-are undesirable, and the drainage basin
provides a natural boundary for considering their interactions.65
In the drainage basin, then, we have an ecosystem that has found wide
expression in international law and is capable of serving as a natural areal
and functional unit for the investigation, monitoring, and control of cross-
media pollution. It provides not merely a conceptual basis for tackling
these problems, but a practical one also, because the surface and ground-
waters of a large drainage basin eventually receive and transmit nearly
all forms of pollution. UNEP's Montreal Guidelines, noted above,' rec-
ognize this characteristic, and the section on planning strategies specif-
ically includes watershed or drainage basin planning, stating that:
This strategy acknowledges that a large proportion of pollution enters
the marine environment via watercourses .... Through consider-
ation of socio-economic and environmental factors utilizing a drain-
age system as the boundary limit, the desired uses and level of quality
that can be attained for any given marine water body are determined.67
INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASIN INSTITUTIONS AND THE
CONTROL OF CROSS-MEDIA POLLUTION
Because the drainage basin provides both a conceptual and practical
unit for dealing with the many forms of cross-media pollution that occur
within its boundaries, and because a large number of river and lake basins
are shared by two or more countries, it would seem logical to use as an
institutional framework entities with a basinwide areal and functional
responsibility.
63. The Preface declares that "ecologists have started to express the integrated totality formed
by air, soil, vegetation and water by the concept 'catchment ecosystem ..... Thus, a drainage
basin can be seen as a group of physical and biological resources linked by a complex of processes."
Id. at M.
64. Reynolds, River Basin as an Ecosystem, in LNKOPiNG SEMINAR, supra note 62, 217, at 223.
65. Cross-media pollution was not discussed at the Linkoping Seminar, but the idea that river
basins might be more appropriate areas than political entities as a geographical focus for analysis
of pollution transfers was put forward in the same year by the Conservation Foundation. Controlling
Cross-Media Pollutants in STATE OF THE ENvIRONMENT: AN ASsESSMENT AT MID-DECADE 319, 353
(1984).
66. MONTREAL GurDWEUNs, supra note 45.
67. Id. Annex I.
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However, are the existing entities in international drainage basins suit-
able to the purpose? What functions could and should they perform to
enable them to act as transboundary environmental agencies? Should they
collect data themselves, or coordinate data collection by agencies of the
basin states? Should they have research and monitoring capability, or rely
on other institutions? Should they establish guidelines and set standards,
not on a medium-by-medium basis as has been done up to now, but on
a basis of total environmental detriment and overall exposure? Should
they have input from non-governmental organizations and from the gen-
eral public? Finally, should their role with respect to member governments
be limited to advice and consultation, or should they and could they have
the power to finalize and enforce measures of control?
Research and Data Gathering
The primary and greatest need is research. As the Conservation Foun-
dation's conference in 1984 brought out, lack of data is characteristic of
any environmental area, but particularly so of cross-media pollution.6" It
may be argued that enough data should have been gathered within the
past quarter of a century on individual media; all that is now required is
to bring together the product of this multifarious research; that the time
has come for action, not digging around for further information. Indeed,
environmentalists themselves have charged that governments and agencies
drag their feet by calling for more data, instead of instituting pollution
control measures. This has been a Canadian complaint in the controversy
between Canada and the United States over acid rain.69 The European
Parliament, too, recently criticized the European Economic Community
(EEC) Commission's proposals for protecting the environment of the
Mediterranean basin, stating that they were vague and inadequate because
they dealt mainly with research, training, information gathering, and
forms of collective deliberation."0
On the other hand, it may be perilous to mandate by treaty or domestic
legislation that an agency act before enough substantive information has
been gathered. The EPA hinted at this notion in 1978, when promulgating
proposed hazardous waste regulations:
Our objective has been to create a program based on as much sub-
stantive data and analysis as possible, but even where we have limited
data the statute requires that we establish standards and controls.7
68. NEW PERSPECnVES, supra note 1. at 3.
69. See generally, ACID RAIN AND FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS: THE PoLcY DispUrE B'TWEEN CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES (Schmandt & Roderick eds. 1986).
70. O.J. EuR. COMM. 485, No. C 141 (1985).
71. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946-58,947 (1978).
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Basic data collection, of at least hydrological or hydrometeorological
information, is already a task of the majority of international water man-
agement agencies.72 Entities with a specific mandate have gone further
and explored not only point sources of water pollution, 73 but also non-
point sources.74 Under the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement,75
the International Joint Commission (UC) established a subordinate body,
the Pollution from Land-Use Activities Reference Group (PLUARG).
The investigation of land uses and land-use activities on a basin-wide
scale was something which had not previously been undertaken before
by any international drainage basin entity, at least not in a pollution
context.76 Subordinate agencies of the UC also explored the extent of
input of toxic substances by deposition from the atmosphere,' and the
UC itself has been asked by the party states to investigate air pollution.78
More recently, a project was begun by federal-provincial agreement in
Canada to research and monitor total human and wildlife exposure within
a river basin to a single pollutant, mercury, via all pathways of contam-
ination, including soils and vegetation, gold mines, and smelters.79 Ac-
cording to the agreement, programs were designed:
(t)o determine the degree to which mercury is present in the Churchill
River Diversion system, its source, the pathways, and mechanisms
72. See R.D. Hayton, Rapporteur, Progress in Co-Operative Arrangements, in EXPERIENCES,
supra note 51, 65-66.
73. E.g., factories or municipal sewage plants discharging effluent by pipe directly into a river
or lake.
74. Such as runoff from city streets, or fertilizer and pesticide contamination from agricultural
activities.
75. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, United States-Canada, Apr. 15, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 301,
24 U.S.T. 2268, T.I.A.S. No. 7312, 7747.
76. See ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR THE GREAT LAKES SYSTEM, Interhational
Reference Group on Great Lakes Pollution From Land Use Activities, Final Report to the International
Joint Commission (1978) (PLUARG).
77. These subordinate agencies included PLUARG, the Water Quality Board, the Upper Lakes
Reference Group, and the Science Advisory Board. See, e.g.. INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE GROUP
ON POLLUTION OF THE GREAT LAKES FROM LAND-USE AcTlvmFs, ATMOSPHERIC LOADING OF THE
LOWER GREAT LAKES AND THE GREAT LAKES DRAINAGE BASIN (Mar. 1977); INTERNATIONAL RE-
FERENCE GROUP ON POLLUTION OF THE GREAT LAKES FROM LAND-USE AcTIvmEs. INTERNATIONAL
JOINT COMMISSION, ATMOSPHERIC LOADINGS TO THE GREAT LAKES (Sept. 1977, mimeographed); and
GREAT LAKES SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD ANNUAL REPORT, A" PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROBLEM OF
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN ECOSYSTEM, 22-26,38-41,51 (Recommendation
1), (1980). The INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, WATER QUALITY OF THE UPPER GREAT LAKES
(1979), stated that:
Atmospheric inputs are disproportionately significant. They directly enter the euphotic
zone of the lakes and are immediately available to the biological community..
Id. at 56. The Upper Lakes Reference Group found that atmospheric inputs might be responsible
for up to 40 percent of the loadings of certain pollutants. Id. at 2.
78. The International Joint Commission: Canada-United States. in EXPERIENCES. supra note 54.
197, 199.
79. Canada-Manitoba Agreement on the Study and Monitoring of Mercury in the Churchill River
Diversion, concluded on Mar. 10, 1983. Photocopy of text provided by the Canada-Manitoba Mercury
Agreement Coordinator, Winnipeg, Manitoba.
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involved in the movement and concentration of mercury in ecosys-
tems and the effects that such mercury may have on the people of
the area ...
Specifically, these programs will investigate the processes by which
mercury is mobilized from natural or anthropogenic sources, bio-
accumulated through the food chain to fish and other animals, and
ultimately consumed by humans.'
It is not beyond the capacity of an international drainage basin com-
mission or committee, given the funds and the manpower (a subject to
which we will return below), to explore the means whereby pollution
arrives or arises in its area of jurisdiction and how that pollution is
transferred from one medium to another.
Regulatory Information
Just as important as the technical data is the regulatory information.
As noted above,' some environmental agencies, such as the EPA in the
United States, are beginning to look into legislation and regulations to
determine if and where the law itself encourages cross-media pollution.
This is a task which"should be undertaken by our hypothetical drainage
basin entity and receive top priority, but it is not as yet being done in a
transboundary context in any systematic way.
The cumulation of regulatory data is not a particularly difficult task
per se. Such information is publicly available in official records and has
been transmitted to computerized data banks by organizations such as the
International Council of Environmental Law.
82
Structure and Staffing
Structure and staffing have a bearing on the composition of drainage
basin entities. Among the existing bodies, some are elaborate multi-level
organizations in which the senior members are usually political figures.83
These members must rely on subsidiary organs, such as advisory boards,
expert groups and ad hoc study teams for scientific and technical infor-
80. Id. Preamble to Schedule A.
81. See supra, note 32.
82. The International Council of Environmental Law has its legal seat in Geneva, but its executive
office is in Bonn (Federal Republic of Germany). One of its main functions is to gather and promote
exchange of information and, apart from storing data, it issues a bibliographical publication entitled
References to Publications Concerning Legal, Administrative and Policy Aspects of Environmental
Conservation.
83. E.g.. the Niger and Senegal commissions, whose highest organ is the meeting of heads of
states and governments. See EXPERmNcas, supra note 51, at 191-96 (Niger), 142-47 (Senegal).
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mation. At the other end of the scale are small and purely technical
commissions, composed usually of water engineers.84
An entity with responsibility for investigating cross-media pollution
should have on its permanent staff not only scientific and technical spe-
cialists, but also lawyers with expertise in the environmental field who
are capable of discerning the environmental impact of past and proposed
legislation and treaties. A number of countries now have environmental
impact assessment procedures, but these are geared rather to the impact
of development than to the impact of regulation.85 It is high time that
impact assessment be directed toward the regulatory activity itself, and
indeed, the EPA in recent regulations, has given consideration to their
potential impact. For instance, its proposed effluent limitations guidelines
of 1985 for the gold placer mining industry86 devote an entire section to
non-water quality environmental impacts, noting that:
(t)he elimination or reduction of one form of pollution may aggravate
other environmental problems.... EPA has considered the effect
of these regulations on air pollution, solid waste generation, land
requirements, energy consumption and consumptive water loss.87
Collaboration in Data Gathering
It is not necessary that the basin entity gather all the information,
technical and regulatory, itself. This would be impossible, for instance,
in the case of atmospheric or other pollution emanating from outside the
region: the commission or committee could only hope to monitor the
effects. Some existing water resource agencies have a mandate to un-
dertake their own research. The Joint Committee for. the Ganges, estab-
lished by the 1977 Agreement between India and Bangladesh,' for example,
was expected to generate data of its own. The commission for protection
of Lake Geneva (Lac Leman) against pollution is another body empow-
ered to organize and carry out all the research it deems necessary and to
make use of the findings.8 9
84. E.g., the Permanent Joint Technical Commission for Nile Waters. EXPERIENCES, supra note
51, at 159.
85. See TECLAFF, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 243-47, 251-55 (1985). For a table
showing which countries among the OECD group have impact statement laws, see OECD 1985,
supra note 1, at 242. Of the 24-member group, eight had such impact laws as of 1984.
86. EPA Proposed Effluent Limitations Guidelines for Gold Placer Mining Industry under Clean
Water Act, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,982 (Nov. 20, 1985).
87. Id. Section XV.
88. Agreement on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka and on Augmenting its Flows. Nov.
5, 1977, India-Bangladesh, art. VI, 17 I.L.M. 104 (1978).
89. Established by the Convention Concerning Protection of Lake Geneva Waters Against Pol-
lution, Nov. 16, 1962, France-Switzerland, 99 U.N.T.S. 49, reprinted in OECD FRONTIER REGIONS
supra note 12, at 418, and in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 28, at 458. art. 3
gives the mandate for research.
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However, many other organizations established by treaty rely on the
contracting parties for information. Some river and frontier waters agree-
ments do not provide for a permanent entity: each party appoints a rep-
resentative plenipotentiary and deputies." In such case, the parties are
merely required to establish principles of cooperation governing the reg-
ular exchange of information.9 Permanent bodies, too, gather data from
member states. The International Commission for Protection of the Rhine
Againt Pollution receives from the contracting parties, according to the
Rhine Chlorides Convention of 1976,92 reports "based on all significant
data from pertinent national programs." '93 And the International Joint
Commission, United States-Canada, which generates its own research
through subordinate bodies, also receives information from agencies of
its member governments. The sheer volume of such investigation can be
staggering: a recent bibliography of publications of the Great Lakes En-
vironmental Research Laboratory (GLERL) within the past ten years
contained 571 studies. 4
Data received from the basin states and their political subdivisions
should be presented in comparable form.95 The quality, accuracy, and
compatibility of information supplied to basin entities have. frequently
left much to be desired.' The history of the Great Lakes International
90. E.g., art. 12 of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 17, 1964, concerning the use of water
resources in frontier waters, 552 U.N.T.S. 108 (1965), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER
LAW, supra note 28, at 245; and art. 9 of the similar agreement between Czechoslovakia and Poland
of Mar. 21, 1958, 538 U.N.T.S. 108 (1965), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW,
supra note 28, at 234.
91. As in art. 8(1) of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 17, 1964, 552 U.N.T.S. 108 (1965),
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 28, at 244.
92. Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by Chlorides, Dec. 3, 1976,
France-Germany-Luxembourg-Netherands-Switzerland, 16 LL.M. 265 (1977).
93. Id. art. 3.
94. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE
OF OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH, GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH LABORATORY,
GPO No. 556-609/10173 Apr. 1974-Mar. 1985 (1985).
95. One of the major recommendations of the Great Lakes Water Quality Board in its 1985 report
to the International Joint Commission was that "'the jurisdictions make every effort to achieve data
compatibility among jurisdictional monitoring and surveillance programs." GREAT LAKES WATER
QUALITY BOARD, 1985 REPORT ON GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY, Recommendation 18 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as WATER QUALITY REPORT].
96. This is so even in such simple matters as topographical surveying and even when the obligation
to provide data is clearly set forth in treaties. For instance, Pakistan claims that most of the con-
troversies that have arisen over the data exchange provisions of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty are
due to India's restrictive interpretation of those provisions. The Permanent Indus Commission, in
EXPERIENCES, supra note 51, 376, 382. In 1957, a Greek-Yugoslav procds-verbal was drawn up
specifically to establish a plan of collaboration for hydroeconomic studies of the drainage basin of
Lake Dojran. One delegation proposed that a joint team coordinate the hydrometrical and topo-
graphical surveys to ensure comparable data. but the other party vigorously opposed such a seemingly
innocuous technical endeavor. Procs-verbal ... Concerning Hydro-economic Studies of the Lake
Dojran Basin, Sept. 1, 1977, Greece-Yugoslavia, Sec. B (I & II), text in U.N. Legis. Ser., supra
note 13, at 813.
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Surveillance Plan (GLISP) illustrates some of the difficulties encountered,
despite a sophisticated strategy for gathering and evaluating data. 97 GLISP
provides a framework for coordinating the efforts of the many agencies
in the United States and Canada responsible for surveillance and moni-
toring of activities under the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agree-
ment.98 The original GLISP antedated the 1978 Agreement and was not
really geared to the ecosystem approach embodied in that instument. It
generated enormous amounts of data which did not, however, provide a
comprehensive picture of ecosystem status. So the GLISP has had to be
updated and refocused, inter alia, to develop compatible methodologies
for common operational components" and to place more emphasis on
compatible data management.o
It is essential, also, that the basin entity have the power of independent
verification of data, when necessary. This was a requirement, for instance,
in the 1974 Draft European Convention for the Protection of International
Watercourses,' 0 t and in the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, °'
and it should be spelled out in all treaty provisions on pollution research
and surveillance.
Monitoring and Surveillance
The importance of monitoring and surveillance in discovering unknown
sources and pathways of contamination cannot be overestimated. Again,
the Great Lakes basin provides pertinent examples. Currently available
data include not only contaminants in water, but also in herring gulls,
fish, and other biota. Within the pa.st 15 years, intensive monitoring at
various levels of the food chain, especially of long-lived predator fish
which accumulate pollutants, has revealed previously unsuspected levels
of persistent toxic substances, for example, mirex in Lake Ontario, tox-
aphene in Lake Superior, and PCBs, dieldrin and chlordane in Lake
Michigan in such concentrations that some fish could not be eaten at
all. 103
These discoveries and others, such as the atmospheric contribution of
pollutants to the Lakes, were instrumental in promoting the ecosystem
approach adopted in the 1978 Water Quality Agreement and in the sub-
97. WATER QUALrrY REPORT, supra note 95, at 65-69.
98. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, supra note 59, art. VI. 1(m) and Annex II.
99. Such as atmospheric monitoring, which is applicable to the entire basin.
100. WATER QUALrrY REPORT, supra note 95, 66-72.
101. Council of Europe, Draft European Convention for the Protection of International Water-
courses Against Pollution, Feb. 1974, art. 15.1(a), text in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, Pt. 2. 346-49
(1974).
102. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972, supra note 75, art. VI.
103. See generally WATER QUALrrY BOARD REPORT, supra note 95, at 72-109, 83 Table 13 (Health
Advisory on Lake Michigan Sport Fish).
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sequent restructuring and updating of the international surveillance plan
itself." The research and monitoring activities of a basin entity, thus,
have a forward-looking, as well as a contemporary aspect. They are
instrumental in the drafting of vehicles for cooperation far into the future,
and they provide the basis not only for the rectification of existing trans-
boundary problems, but also for the prevention of new ones.
Funding
Fundamental to the whole matter is the question of money and man-
power. An entity with broadbased and interconnected responsibilities must
have funds and staff equal to the task, otherwise it will give the semblance
of an international cooperative endeavor where none effectively exists.
There are a great many bilateral and multilateral commissions for the
resolution of all sorts of transboundary issues, especially in Europe, with
its many land frontiers.' 5 Yet their very existence tends to induce com-
placency and becloud the fact that a problem does not go away merely
by setting up a commission to look into it. The drainage basin entities
have been victims of this type of thinking. Many of them, as noted above,
are surprisingly small bodies and meet only at infrequent intervals. Some
do not even have a permanent secretariat, or any physical headquarters
or assets, and function only when their members meet."
Even large and complex organizations, however, have funding diffi-
culties. For instance, the Commission of the European Economic Com-
munity completed, in 1979, a voluminous study of the underground water
resources of the Community, with ten country reports and 152 maps, but
had no funds to print and disseminate the results.0 7 The International
Joint Commission, United States-Canada, also has had reason to complain
of a paucity of research money and manpower. The heart of the UC's
problem is that, as a former chairman of the Canadian section pointed
out:
Whatever funds are needed for individual studies and whatever per-
sonnel are required for long or short-term boards-for such functions
as control, monitoring and surveillance-have been provided by the
regular line departments of both countries."'
104. Id. 66-72.
105. See Note by the Secretariat listing commissions and working parties, appended to Environ-
mental Protection Problems in Frontier Regions, in Table (Annex 2), OECD FRoNnaR REGIONS,
supra note 12, at 69-90.
106. E.g., the Permanent Indus Commission and the Joint Greek-Yugoslav Commission for the
Development of the Vardar-Axios. The participating states each appoint a commissioner, whose staff
members are seconded from their country's permanent civil service. G.J. Cano, Rapporteur, Insti-
tutional and Legal Arrangements, in ExPER 'c.s, supra note 51. at 48.
107. O.J. Etu. COMM. 6, No. C 60 (1981).
108. Cohen, River Basin Planning, in ExPERiENcEs. supra note 51, 107, 125.
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This has left the Commission vulnerable to budgetary restrictions inflicted
by the parties on their own agencies. For example, between 1981 and
1984 the EPA's Great Lakes National Program Office had its budget and
manpower cut from $6.5 million and 20.5 staff positions to $4.6 million
and 15 staff positions." 9 The types of research mandated by the 1978
Agreement-emphasis on toxic substances, identification of airborne pol-
lutant sources, and impairment of tributary water quality through atmo-
spheric deposition-together would enable the Great Lakes jurisdictions
to make a long stride toward the recognition of cross-media pollution
impacts. That possibility remains ephemeral, however, for the Commis-
sion continued to criticize funding arrangements which, it claimed, result
in "an uncertain research climate and a diminished human scientific
resource base for needed work.""'
In multistate basins, problems are bound to arise over the allocation
of expenses among member governments. Unlike the costs of develop-
ment projects, which are often apportioned among states according to
benefits ultimately received, the expenses of pollution research, moni-
toring and surveillance are rarely so equitably divided. European countries
have made much of the so-called polluter-pays' principle as applied to
individual polluters and polluting industries."' They seem less willing to
apply it as among states. The Netherlands, for example, as the lowermost
downstream riparian, is the chief victim of the chlorides pollution of the
Riyer Rhine. Yet, it is obligated to pay the same proportion of expenses
as the major upstream polluters, France and West Germany, for any
enquiry carried out under the 1976 Rhine Chlorides Convention. "
Obviously, it will be difficult to allocate the cost of investigating the
sources and pathways of pollution transferred from one medium to an-
other, especially that which originates outside the drainage basin. "' Per-
haps the simplest (though not necessarily the fairest) procedure for sharing
research expenses would be something like that adopted by the Italian-
Swiss Commission for the Protection from Pollution of Common Waters:
the formula was based on geographical and demographic criteria, such
that Italy was charged close to 54 percent (for Lake Maggiore) and
Switzerland just over 46 percent (for Lake Lugano). "'i
109. 6 INT'L ENrT'L REP. (BNA), CuRR. REP. 552-53 (1983).
110. UC SEcoND BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 11.
111. The polluter-pays principle, as adopted by the member states of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-Operation and Development, places the initial responsibility for paying the cost of pollution
abatement on the enterprises causing the pollution. The costs are subsequently passed on to consumers
in the form of higher prices. See OECD 1985, supra note 1, at 251-53.
112. Rhine Chlorides Convention, supra note 92, art. 10, Sec. (2).
113. See, e.g., the elaborate system of contributions for each participating state contained in the
Annex to the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-
Term Financing of the Co-Operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range
Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe, Sept. 28, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 484, at 488 (1985).
114. Rizzo, The Commission for the Protection from Pollution of Common Waters: Italy-Switzer-
land, in ExPERImNcEs, supra note 51, 364, 366.
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Public Support and Participation
Some of the most useful information is supplied free of charge by the
general public, a public that has become increasingly aware of environ-
mental risks and is alert for signs of trouble. Groups that represent sectors
of the public, such as environmental organizations, water users' associ-
ations, or labor unions, quite often conduct their own research or hire
experts to investigate pollution threats. They not only provide a valuable
nongovernmental counterpart to agency data-gathering and surveillance,
but also an independent review of administrative decision making."
5
Public support for environmental programs in many of the industrialized
countries is, apparently, as strong as or even stronger than it was in the
heyday of the environmental movement. In the United States, for instance,
membership in major environmental organizations increased by the same
percentage in the early 1980s as it had in the early 1970s." 6 More than
87 percent of the Japanese, a higher proportion than in the United States,
are concerned about environmental risks." 7 In Belgium, Finland, France,
West Germany, Italy, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom environ-
mental issues have provided the platforms of "green" parties in local and
national politics." '
Consequently, governments have become more willing to make pro-
vision for informing the public and permitting its involvement in many
areas of resource planning and management. As an example, due to the
fears of industry that disclosure of discharge permit information by the
authorities would release industrial secrets, the British public was long
barred by law from effectively knowing in any detail about the country's
water pollution controls." 9 In 1985, however, the water pollution reg-
isters, with all their particulars on permit applications, samples of effluent,
and other details, were made available to the public for the first time. 2 '
This was not only because of a growing belief that the public had a right
to be kept informed and to participate in decision making, but also because
of the acknowledged professionalism of environmental organizations and
their ability to evaluate scientific and technical data.'
Such expanded public access to information and to administrative pro-
115. On the role of the public and its representatives in environmental risk assessment, see STATE
OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AN ASSESSMENT AT MID-DECADE, supra note 65, at 298.
116. Id. at 29.
117. Id. at 31.
118. OECD 1985. supra note 1, at 258. See also Despax, Collective Defence of the Environment
andAdmissibility of Proceedings in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, in OECD FRONTIER REOIONS,
supra note 12, 200. 203 n. 2, which cites a figure of 20,000 environmental organizations in nine
European countries.
119. See Waite, Informing the Public on Fresh-Water Pollution: The New Registers, 15 ENVT'L
POL. & L. 115 (1985).
120. Id. at 116.
121. Id. at 120.
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cedures is beginning to be applied also to transboundary matters, both in
doctrine and in state practice. The Organization for Economic Co-Op-
eration and Development, in guidelines aimed at promoting cooperation
for frontier region environmental protection, recommended that:
Countries shouldin particular take care to see that persons exposed
to a significant risk of transfrontier pollution are informed through
channels selected by the Countries themselves and enabled to the
same extent as persons in the Country of origin, to take part under
similar conditions in administrative and judicial hearings and pro-
ceedings. m
This principle of equal right of access is enshrined in the Nordic Envi-
ronmental Convention of 1974,'2 and it was expressed also in a proposed
Council directive of the European Economic Community on environ-
mental impact assessment. 24 The proposed directive did not originally
contain a provision for participation by members of the public in another
state, but the amended text was worded thus:
If the project is likely to produce significant effect on the environment
in another Member State, the population of that Member State should
also be able to take part in the consultation process. The Member
states shall determine, in the framework of their bilateral or multi-
lateral relations, the most appropriate arrangements for this pur-
pose. '25
These and similar recommendations have been translated into, and
even anticipated by, the practice of communities in frontier regions,
especially in Europe, where potentially harmful activities (such as the
siting of nuclear power plants)'tend to be located on or near the many
122. Guidelines for International Co-Operation with Regard to Environmental Protection in Fron-
tier Regions, I (2), reprinted in OECD FRONTIER REGIONS, supra note 12. For a more recent
expression of the concept, see UNEP Cairo Guidelines, Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on the
Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes, Third Session, Cairo, 4-10 Dec. 1985,
reprinted in 16 ENVT'L POL. & L. 31 (1986). Paragraph 18. on equal access and treatment, proclaims
that, in granting authorizations or operating permits for the disposal of hazardous wastes which may
have transfrontier effects, the authorizing state should accord public authorities and nationals of the
state concerned the same right of participation in administrative and judicial proceedings as those
accorded its authorities and nationals. Id. at 32.
123. Nordic Environment Convention, Feb. 19, 1974, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, 13
I.L.M. 591 (1974). art. 3 provides for a right of access for persons who are or may be affected by
environmentally harmful activities in another contracting state.
124. European Economic Community, Proposal to Amend the Proposal for a Council Directive
Concerning the Assessment of the Environmental Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects,
O.J. Eut. COMM. 5, No. C 110 (1982).
125. Id. art. 8.2. The original proposal is contained in O.J. EUJR. COMM. 14. No. C 149 (1980).
The amended proposal failed to meet with approval and this provision was dropped from the final
text in Council Directive of 27 June 1985, on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and
Private Projects on the Environment, O.J. Etm. COMM., 40 No. L 175 (1985). The corresponding
art. 7 of the final Directive refers only to exchanges of information between states. Id. at 42.
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boundary waters.' 26 Thus, German citizens have been given access to
administrative authorities in Switzerland and France, and Dutch citizens
to administrative authorities in France and Germany. 27 Nevertheless, it
must be acknowledged that, in many countries, there is still considerable
reluctance on the part of administrations at all levels to admit the public
or its representatives to the investigating and planning, let alone decision-
making, procedures of an agency." s
This attitude is also evident in the work of the international river basin
commissions. For instance, a report on the Italian-Swiss Commission for
the Protection from Pollution of Common Waters states that "an infor-
mation system for the public is not foreseen, nor is public participation
in the meetings of the ... Commission expected." 29 Two outstanding
exceptions to such a restrictive approach are the Finnish-Swedish Frontier
Rivers Commission and the International Joint Commission, United States-
Canada (IJC). The Finnish-Swedish Frontier Rivers Commision is unusual
also in that it is a permit-granting institution. 3° Before making a decision
on any activity liable to cause pollution, the Commission must give an
opportunity for objections to be raised, not only by authorities but also
by individuals. '' Moreover, individuals may complain to the Commission
about polluting activities for which no permit was applied for or granted. '32
The UC has held public hearings for many years. Its power to do so
stems from the investigative functions assigned to it under the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909,'3 and has been further enlarged by the two Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreements. 3 ' In its Second Biennial Report in
1984, the Commission devoted more space to its role vis-a-vis the Great
Lakes community than to its role in assisting governments. '35 The Com-
mission declared forthrightly that, without active community support, it
126. Environmental Protection Problems in Frontier Regions (Note by the Secretariat) in OECD
FRONTIER REGIONS, supra note 12, at 33.
127. See LAmme. supra note 52, 25-27 (footnotes).
128. See TEcLAFF, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 245-51 (1985); and LAMMERS, supra
note 52, at 24-27, 42-43.
129. Rizzo. The Commission for the Protection from Pollution of Common Waters: Italy-Swit-
zerland, in EXPERIENCES. supra note 51, at 365.
130. See generally on the Finnish-Swedish Frontier Rivers Commission, LAMMERS, supra note
52, 65-68; and Ratia, International-River Commissions: Experiences of Finland, in ExPERIENcas,
supra note 51, 324, 326-28.
131: Agreement Concerning Frontier Rivers, 16 Sept. 1971. Finland-Sweden, Ch. 8, art. 4, 825
U.N.T.S. 191. English translation at 272.
132. Id.
133. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 36 Stat. 2449, T.S. No. 548, art. IX and XII.
134. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972, supra note 75, and Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement of 1978, supra note 59. The UC has admitted, however, that the public hearing
process, while an integral part of its activities, had not always been a successful mode of public
participation. IJC SEcOND BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 16.
135. Cf. IJC SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 44, 15 (Commission and Government) and
at 15-16 (Commission and Community).
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was "probably beyond the reach of any agency or government, alone or
in combination" to achieve the objectives of the 1978 Agreement.3 6
Following up on its previously expressed need for a more direct form of
discourse, the UC announced that it was attempting to foster such dis-
course through public discussion at meetings of its Boards and that it was
considering ways for the public to comment on and contribute to the
Commission's own analyses.
13 7
There is no valid reason why a public that is being accorded a trans-
boundary right of access (in doctrine, in treaties, and in frontier region
practice) to the administrative proceedings of national and local author-
ities, should be denied such access to an international agency with re-
sponsibilities for an entire basin and obligations to the basin community.
Indeed, some years ago, in a discussion of new and expanded adminis-
trative functions of an international river basin commission, it was sug-
gested that the commission represent the collective interests of the basin
vis-a-vis the various government authorities and that it would, in this
way, benefit from the principle of equal right of hearing established for
nationals of the basin states.138 Such an ombudsman-like role would be
particularly appropriate in the context of cross-media pollution control.
Advice and Recommendations
A drainage basin entity performing as a transboundary environmental
agency should have an equally important responsibility toward member
governments-to give advice and recommendations. How well it would
carry out this task from the standpoint of the-common goal sought would
depend on several factors, including its composition, the level of rep-
resentation (ministerial, subministerial, or .nongovernmental), and the
level of expertise among individual members of the organization.
Entities such as the International Boundary and Water Commission,
United States-Mexico, or the Indus Commission, have only one level of
authority."' Others, especially those established fairly recently in devel-
oping countries, have many organs and several levels of authority, from
heads of state down to technical committees. The Niger Basin Authority
and the Organisation Pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal are of
136. Id. at 16.
137. Id. The need for a more direct form of discourse was expressed in 1982 in INTERNATIONAL
JOINT COMMISSION, FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT UNDER THE GREAT LAKES WATER QuAMY AGREEMENT
OF 1978 30 (1982).
138. See Dupuy, Normative and Institutional Proposals for the Integrated Management of Inter-
national Hydrographic Basins, in OECD FRONTIER REGIONS, supra note 12, 151, 167.
139. On the structure and functions of these entities, see Friedkin, The International Boundary
and Water Commission: Mexico-UnitedStates, in EXPERIENCES, supra note 5 I, at 204-16; and Ministry
of Irrigation, India, The Indus Commission and the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, in
ExPERIENcEs, supra note 51, at 359-63.
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this type. " Top level representation might appear to be the most effective
in getting things done and providing a pipeline of ready access to gov-
ernment. In fact, where a commission lacks such representation, it has
sometimes been necessary to resort to ministerial action. For instance, it
took an interministerial conference in 1972 to prod the International Com-
mission for the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution into drawing
up the chlorides and chemical conventions of 1976. " '
However, entities with a lower level of representation have had con-
siderable success in an advisory role. One such is the International Joint
Commission, United States-Canada. It has quite an elaborate organiza-
tional structure, with many subordinate bodies, a broad interdisciplinary
mix of expert advisors, and a fair amount of independence of action.'42
Its recommendations are not binding, yet about three-quarters of them
were accepted by the two governments.' 43 It was the Commission's im-
partial studies and recommendations that laid the basis for the Great Lakes
water quality agreements of 1972 and 1978.'" Nevertheless, the increased
complexity of its organization since then seems to have created problems,
and bears a warning for any drainage basin entity taking on additional
responsibilities.
The IC has repeatedly found it necessary to reassert the importance
of maintaining its independence and integrity under the pollution agree-
ments. It had occasion to do so at length in its First Biennial Report,
following the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.'45 In that
report, the Commission questioned the objectivity of one of its own
subordinate bodies, the Water Quality Board,'" and in its Second Biennial
140. The Niger Basin Authority has four levels of competence: the Summit of Heads of State
and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Executive Secretariat, and the Technical Committee
of Experts. See Newsletter, International Rivers and Lakes 2 (Dec. 1982); and Technical Note on
the River Niger Commission, in EXPERIENCES. supra note 51, 191-96.
The OMVS also has four levels: the Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, the High Com-
missioner, and the Permanent Water Commission. See Quoc-Lan Nguyen, Powers of the Organization
for the Development of the Senegal River in Development of the River Basin, in EXPERIENCES, supra
note 51, at 142-47.
141. Kamminga, Who Can Clean Up the Rhine?, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS
AND LAKES 371, 373 (R. Zacklin & L. Caflisch, eds. 1981).
142. See the Annex showing the organization of the UC in EXPERIENCES, supra note 51, at 203.
143. Cohen, River Basin Planning: Observations from International and Canada-United States
Experience, in EXPERIENCES, supra note 51, 107, 115. Nevertheless, there have been complaints
that the IJC has not been consulted as much as it should have been. In 1983 a member of the
International Great Lakes Fishery Commission declared that the IJC had been bypassed as often as
it was used. 6 INT'L ENvT'L REP. (BNA), CuRR. REP. 463-64 (1983). And in 1985, a Canadian
study, noting that neither government had asked the IJC to investigate how the acid rain problem
could be resolved, reportedly declared that the Commission had never reached its full potential. 8
INT'L ENVr'I REP. (BNA), CuRR. REP. 351 (1985).
144. See supra, notes 75 and 59.
145. IJC FIRST BImtNA. REPORT, supra note 137, 28-29.
146. Id. at 29.
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Report, the IJC expressed concern about the use of Commission resources
to implement parts of the toxic substances control strategy on behalf of
the parties. 47 It said:
The Commission is concerned about the use of its limited resources
and the implications for its role under the Agreement should this
tendency continue. When Commission groups act on behalf of the
Parties in implementing such a strategy, the Commission's ability to
comment on the effectiveness of programs and strategies under the
Agreement is compromised. .. .'"
Within the general recommendatory powers of an entity the develop-
ment of guidelines is very important. In essence, it means setting down
in black and white the desired objective, for example, abatement and
control of pollution, and outlining very broadly the measures whereby
the objective is to be achieved. The Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development, for instance, has issued a number of such
guidelines in the form of Recommendations. Its Recommendations on
Water Management Policies and Instruments of 1978, are typical. 49 Con-
cerning cross-media pollution, they propose that authorities ensure that
the water pollution control measures they implement do not lead to un-
controlled pollution transfers to other water resources or other media.'5
That is the objective. Then, in comment, they indicate the kind of mea-
sures that should be adopted, again very generally-authorities should
ensure that economic and regulatory instruments and controls are "com-
prehensive and correctly balanced."'' This type of framework guideline
has not changed very much since then, even though somewhat more is
known now about transfers of pollution. Among the dozen categories of
significant regulatory action which the EPA set itself in its Operating
Guidance for the year 1986-1987, Category 10 provides that the EPA
shall "implement a coordinated approach to solve multimedia pollution
concerns in discrete geographic areas. " '52
It is certainly within the competence of an international river basin
commission in its advisory capacity to set forth guidelines for member
governments and their agencies concerning cross-media pollution. Many
147. UC SE OND BIENNIAL REPOWT, supra note 44, at 5.
148. Id.
149. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Recommendations of the Coun-
cil on Water Management Policies and Instruments, issued in Paris, Apr. 5. 1978, reprinted in
C PoNERA 1980, supra note 38, at 193.
150. Id. No. 7.
151. Id. at 195, Appendix No. 7.
152. See Excerpts from Budget Office Regulatory Program Listing EPAs Priorities from Apr. 1,
1985 to Mar. 31, 1986, Agency Operating Guidance FY 1986-1987, reprinted in 16 ENv'T. ReP.
(BNA), CuRR. Dav. 658, 659 (1985).
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of them already do so for water pollution and, since an ecosystem ap-
proach was adopted for the Great Lakes Basin in the 1978 Water Quality
Agreement,' 53 the International Joint Commission has broadened its role
to encompass that approach, both in its own biennial reports and in the
recommendations of its advisory boards."5I
The recommendatory role of a commission would be strengthened if
it were allowed to propose specific numerical standards and practices for
specific media, at least within the drainage basin area. The standards
might be uniform for the whole basin or variable, depending on the sources
of pollution and their location. Some commissions already have such
powers insofar as water pollution is concerned. Among the responsibilities
given the International Joint Commission by the 1978 Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement is tendering of "specific recommendations concerning
•.. standards and other regulatory requirements,"' 5 and it has since
recommended new or revised water quality objectives for eleven sub-
stances. '56
Likewise, the International Commission for the Protection of Lac Leman
(Lake Geneva) has the power to draft regulations and recommend to
governments the measures to be taken to deal with pollution." 7 Accord-
ingly, the Commission made recommendations on control measures and
the purification of lake waters, but took more than a decade to adopt
directives for the discharge of effluent.'58 The International Commission
for the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution also seems to have been
rather dilatory in recommending emission standards for substances listed
in Annex I of the 1976 Rhine Chemical Convention.'59 By mid-1980 the
Commission had recommended limit values for only one substance, mer-
cury. 160
Actual standard-setting by a commission itself, as opposed to recom-
mendations, is an altogether more difficult proposition. Few river basin
commissions have the competence unilaterally to set standards and reg-
ulations for control even of surface-water pollution from readily identi-
fiable sources. One long-established exception is the Central Commission
for Rhine Navigation, whose regulatory capacity dates back to the 1868
153. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, supra note 59.
154. See IJC FmsT Boae&AL REPORT, supra note 136; IJC SEcoND BIaENI. REPORT, supra note
44; and WATER QUALITY BOARD REPORT, supra note 95.
155. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, supra note 59, art. VII, Sec. 1(c).
156. IJC SECOND BImeNAL RmORT, supra note 44, at 8. The substances are pentachlorophenol,
polychlorinated dibenzodioxins, phosphorus, cyanide, selenium, mirex, chlorine, lead, microbiol-
ogical indicators, diazinon, and polyaromatic hydrocarbons.
157. Franco-Swiss Convention of Nov. 16, 1962, supra note 89, arts. 3(b) and 3(c).
158. See Lwmms, supra note 52, at 244..
159. Rhine Chemical Convention of 1976, supra note 15.
160. LAMMERs, supra note 52, at 189-90.
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Mannheim Convention.' 6' It can prohibit the dumping of substances in
the river, limit the kinds of materials transported, and set conditions for
their transport, loading and unloading: however, its authority is strictly
limited to navigation.'62 Another entity with somewhat unusual powers
is the Finnish-Swedish Boundary Rivers Commission, whose general
function is to control the use of frontier water systems and monitor water
conditions, but whose main task is to handle permit applications.'63 It
may refuse permission or establish conditions for activities liable to cause
"substantial inconvenience" from pollution." There are more than 50
specific types of installations which may not be constructed without per-
mission, but the Commission's mandate is sufficiently broad to allow it
to regulate almost any activity on its own initiative.'65 Control of indi-
vidual polluters is virtually unique among international river basin entities.
An intermediate stage between merely making recommendations and
actually setting standards is more feasible. This is when a commission
drafts regulations or standards which become obligatory if not objected
to by one of the basin states within a specified period of time."'
Another advisory function a river basin entity should perform in its
ecosystem approach to cross-media pollution is to propose to member
governments recommendations for drawing up a new treaty or reinter-
preting an old one, or for harmonizing municipal laws and regulations.
As noted above,' 67 the IJC's reports formed the basis for two new pollution
agreements. Similarly, the International Commission for the Protection
of the Rhine Against Pollution was instrumental in drafting the chlorides
and chemical conventions of 1976.161 India and Bangladesh established,
in 1972, a joint rivers commission for the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna
delta. " 9 This body's deliberations provided the initial framework of the
Ganges Water Agreement of 1977, and all of the members took part in
161. Convention... Respecting Navigation of the Rhine, Oct. 17, 1868, 20 MARTris, NouVEAU
REcm. 355, PARRY's T.S., v. 138, at 167-79. The Commission's authority is based on Arts. XLIII-
XLVII.
162. The Central Commission for Rhine Navigation, in ExPERIENcEs, supra note 51, at 266-
67. The Commission's regulations do not derive directly from the Mannheim Convention, which
imposed only the negative obligation of ensuring that navigation is not impeded. The pollution
controls are elaborated in a series of waterway codes of recent date, adopted by resolution by the
Central Commission, and then incorporated into the legal system of the contracting states.
163. Agreement Concerning Frontier Rivers, 16 Sept. 197 1, Finland-Sweden, 825 U.N.T.S. 191.
164. Id. ch. 6, art. 7.
165. Id. The list of installations which may not be constructed without permission is contained
in Annex C of the Agreement.
166. See Colorado, Tijuana, and Rio Grande Treaty, 1944, United States-Mexico, supra note 22,
art. 25, prescribes a period of 30 days.
167. See supra at note 144.
168. See supra note 21; also LAMMnns, supra note 52, 171-83.
169. See ExPmuENcs, supra note 51, 273, 276.
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the negotiations. 'o The International Boundary and Witter Commission,
United States-Mexico, submits its policy recommendations to the two
governments in the form of "minutes." These minutes, when approved,
have the force of executive agreements and are, in effect, modifications
of the basic 1944 Treaty.' 7' Such was Minute No. 242 of 1973 for a
solution to the salinity problem of the Colorado River.'72
Interagency Collaboration
The idea of a single entity with responsibility for the protection of an
entire international drainage basin against cross-media pollution has a
powerful appeal in its holistic approach. One commission--to carry out
research and monitoring, to mobilize the interest and support of the basin
community, to advise governments, recommend control strategies, and
draft instruments of cooperation-would undoubtedly be more effective
than two or three. In some very large, multistate basins, however, this
may not be possible. Indeed, there is an observable trend toward creating
commissions for sub-basins, though these are more often technical bodies
established to oversee particular hydraulic works. In the huge La Plata
Basin, for instance, there are no fewer than a dozen such agencies, with
little or no coordination among them.7 3
However, when it comes to pollution prevention in large basins such
as that of the Rhine, a genuine basin approach is emerging and individual
bodies may be able to achieve by linkage what they could not achieve
separately. As long ago as 1963, the Berne Agreement establishing the
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine Against Pol-
lution propounded the linkage approach. 74 It required the Commission
to collaborate with other international commissions created for the Rhine
tributaries and estuaries. 175
170. Id. at 276. For agreement, see supra note 88.
171. Colorado, Tijuana, and Rio Grande Treaty, 1944, United States-Mexico supra note 22. On
the nature of these "minutes" and the procedures for submitting them, see Friedkin, supra note 139.
at 206. Each commissioner serves as technical advisor to the department of foreign relations of his
government in the negotiation and drafting of boundary and water treaties.
172. Text of lBWC Minute No. 2421, ST. DEP'T BuL.. 395 (1973), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 28, at 360.
173. See the table in Cano, Legal and Administrative Tools for River Basin Development, in
LINKOPING SEMINAR, supra note 62, 118, 125. On the other hand, some sub-basin commissions
have themselves recommended the creation of a single basin entity. For example, the Technical
Committee for the hydrometeorological survey project of the upper Nile basin, and the Permanent
Joint Technical Commission for Nile Waters (Egypt-Sudan), in the lower basin, have recommended
and are studying proposals for the formation of a consolidated nine-state Nile basin commission.
See ExPERIENcEs, supra note 51, at 163, 295-96, and 402.
174. Agreement Concerning the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine Against
Pollution, Apr. 29, 1963, supra note 21.
175. Id. art. 10. The Protocol of Signature accompanying the Agreement states that the collab-
oration provided for in art. 10 shall specifically be instituted with the international commissions for
the Moselle, Saar (Sarre), and Lake Constance, as well as with the Central Commission for the
Navigation of the Rhine, and that the first objective should be a regular and complete exchange of
information.
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The idea of linking sub-basin entities was given general expression in
the 1974 Draft European Convention for the Protection of International
Watercourses Against Pollution, which provided for international com-
missions operating in the same hydrographic basin. '76 This strategy holds
promise for entities with a cross-media pollution mandate, and even where
formal collaboration cannot be achieved, some form of consultation mech-
anism should be set up between entities already in place. For instance,
Hungarian experts have been invited since 1977 to the sub-committee
sessions of the Yugoslav-Austrian Mura River Commission, because the
Mura contributes pollution to the Drava, which flows into Hungary.'"
Such informal exchanges-which might take place also between river
basin commissions and air pollution commissions-are at least a step
toward a true ecosystem framework.
CONCLUSIONS
It is time to stop thinking of the drainage basin as a discrete com-
partment of the environment labeled water, as if air and land had no part.
In fact, jurists may have done the drainage basin a disservice in recent
literature and in the pronouncements of international water law bodies
by substituting for it the term "watercourse system." Watercourse system
is a handy, self-explanatory, indeed necessary, expression if one is con-
sidering water use alone. But the drainage basin is more than that. It is
an ecosystem, defined by a natural land boundary, with a land area drained
by surface streams, underlain by soils and groundwaters, overlain by the
atmosphere, and occupied by innumerable forms of life, including man-
all components of the environment that interact in ways of which we are
still ignorant.
If we are to adopt an ecosystem approach to the problem of trans-
boundary cross-media pollution, and the drainage basin is an ecosystem
that has already gained recognition in legislation and treaties as a unit
for more than water resources protection or management per se, then we
must take a long, hard look at the institutional framework in international
drainage basins. Many of the existing institutions in these basins were
established at a time when pollution was considered only one of their
concerns, and perhaps a minor one at that. But, though it is necessary
176. Draft European Convention for the Protection of International Watercourses Against Pol-
lution, 1974, supra note 101, art. 14 (3).
177. See ExPERNcEs, supra note 51, at 345. See also Federal Water Pollution Control Act,§ 3 10(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1320(a), which permits, on a basis of reciprocity, public officials of foreign
countries, which are or may be adversely affected by pollution originating in the United States, to
attend and participate with the same rights as a U.S. state water pollution control agency in public
hearings relating to that pollution. A similar provision is contained in the Clean Air Act, § 115, 42
U.S.C. § 7415 (1982). On the equal right of access of foreign officials, see also Tit. B. 7. of the
Annex to OECD, Recommendation of the Council for the Implementation of a Regime of Equal
Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, adopted May 17,
1977, OECD Doc. C (77) 28 (Final) of May 23, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 977 (1977).
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to create entities where none exist at all, it is not necessary to multiply
them; in fact, that may be counterproductive.
One issue to emerge from recent discussions of cross-media pollution
is that there are too many bodies presiding over an artificially fragmented
environment. We need to strengthen the present basin organizations by
granting a broader mandate and a truly basin-wide area of jurisdiction.
The drainage basin entity, granted appropriate powers, can perform in-
valuable functions, including: linking information systems, making data
available to all its "constituents," advising member governments on leg-
islation and regulations, reporting adverse impacts, and warning of injury
to human health and the environment. In effect, it should be a watchdog
for the bioregional implementation of principles of international law con-
cerning shared natural resources.
This paper has dealt with the procedural aspects of curbing cross-media
pollution. However, even the most efficient organization with a jurisdic-
tion extending over a near-perfect area will have to come to grips with
actually controlling that pollution. The best procedures are only half the
battle; the other half will depend on the effectiveness of the means and
the substantive rules employed by the anti-pollution agencies. There are
three possibilities: to put the pollutants where they cannot be transferred
to other media; to tighten up the recycling of waste materials so that there
are fewer residuals; or, to cease doing or producing things that cause
pollution.
The most obvious means, of course, is to find places for safe, permanent
disposal of the pollutants. The situation is desperate and this is shown
by suggestions that less polluted localities should be sacrificed as dumps
for the sake of the over-burdened, more developed ones. For instance,
the Environmental Affairs Commissioner of the European Economic Com-
munity proposed to the European Parliament that countries having the
"ecological capacity" to dispose of radioactive waste should exhibit
"community solidarity" and accept such waste from member states unable
to dispose of it on their own territory.' Naturally, representatives from
thinly populated and less industrialized peripheral areas voiced alarm that
their "ecological capacity" be used (or, rather, abused) in such fashion.
Their concern is the interoational counterpart of NIMBY ("Not in My
Backyard"), the watchword of communities in the United States that
refuse to harbor disposal sites for nuclear and other hazardous wastes. 7 9
178. 7 IT"L ENVT'L REP. (BNA), CUtR. REP. 46-47 (1984).
179. See, e.g., the map of potential nuclear waste sites in mostly rural areas of 15 states in 2
U.S. WATER NEws 12 (No. 9, Mar. 1986). However, a decision by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals
on Nov. 1, 1985, suggests that even if communities succeed in keeping out nuclear waste dumps,
they may not be able to exclude other hazardous materials. The Court ruled that the national interest
in the safe disposal of hazardous materials outweighed the wishes of towns and counties to reject a
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This approach, of course, poses a host of legal,. political and ethical
questions, including the problem of the right to maintain existing envi-
ronmental well-being in some areas as against the right to development
in others. It may be that, in accordance with the tenets of utilitarian
ethics, the happiness of the greater number will eventually prevail. There
is little doubt, however, that such relocation of wastes, if undertaken on
a global scale, would have to be preceded by far-reaching changes in the
international system of independent and sovereign states. This is under-
scored by the fact that the proposals noted above, tentative as they are,
came from within the European Economic Community, whose avowed
aim is eventual political integration.
Tightening the rules for recycling waste materials would seem to entail
fewer changes in present political systems and, therefore, might be more
palatable generally--especially since it would be in keeping with the
prevalent faith in the omnipotence of technology and the virtue of de-
velopment. In the first place, however, it is not at all certain that advances
in technology can keep recycled wastes from eventually coming back to
pollute, any more than a juggler can keep a set of plates in the air forever.
Second, the costs of recycling and the very comprehensive regulation
needed would entail more drastic political and economic changes than
we may be willing to face and prepare for. There is, of course, a third
option: to stop expanding numerically and- economically, so that we pol-
lute less. But is it a genuine option? Can we maintain our civilization
without growth?
Notwithstanding the difficulties of dealing effectively with cross-media
pollution, some measures will have to be undertaken if our civilization
is to remain free of the threat of burial under its own refuse. We-can
expect these measures to be reluctantly, hesitantly and painfully applied.
The adoption of an effective institutional framework may make painful
decisions more palatable when they can no longer be avoided. At best it
can help to solve the problem: at the very least it can buy time.
site. The decision overturned an ordinance adopted by St. James Parish in Louisiana to prohibit the
treatment, storage and disposal of PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls) within the parish. Rollins
Environmental Services (FS), Inc. v. Parish of St. James, 775 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1985). Rollins, a
Delaware corporation, had developed a national system of toxic waste disposal facilities and sought
to locate a processing plant in St. James Parish.
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